Online since 1997 The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent ModelClick on a title to get information such as reviews, price comparisons, and availability or to purchase. Search Again-Enter Keyword, Title, or ISBN: |
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The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model |
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Binding: Paperback Dewey Decimal Number: 338.9 EAN: 9780691091846 Edition: illustrated edition ISBN: 0691091846 Label: Princeton University Press Manufacturer: Princeton University Press Number Of Items: 1 Number Of Pages: 421 Publication Date: December 26, 2001 Publisher: Princeton University Press Studio: Princeton University Press |
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| Customer Reviews | ||
 - Very good well written bookThis book rates 5 stars because it is suprisingly easy to read for such a heavy deep subject. The examples and qoutes are well place and very illustrative. I would very much recommend this book. The most outstanding aspect is the way it approaches the theories on a small scale and expands them incrementally to secure the readers understanding at each stage of the "flow". Rating: - Review Theory of IncentivesThis book is really good for people studying contract theory and with some knowledge of game theory. Slightly advanced, but really good. Rating: - Great BookI had a project work. I was struggling with a P/A model in other books' examples. But this book is a gem. I got what I wanted in less than two days. I am an average student and the various models and extensions are very helpful in understanding the material. I love the cover and the color combination also. I dont have it now. But will buy one. G-R-E-A-T Book. Give it a try. Rating: - Master Piece from the MasterThe book provides a systhesis of contract theory at the phd level. It begins with basic idea of adverse selection and then its extension and followed by basic moral hazard model and its extension. The selected topics are presented here in a consistent fashion of the main ideas. Applications are well presented along the models. Nonverifiability, the mixed model of adverse selection and moral hazard and some dynamic aspects of the two are also incorporated in a great deal of details. This is the text on incentive theory, not just introduction. Its comprehensive insights are useful and time-saving for readers. You need not to read a bulk of papers, after reading the book, you just complement it with some core papers of the topics. (such as multidimensional screening, random participation) If there is some weakness, it would be that... the authors present some topics too short and some notation used are not well explained, particularly the extension of the core models and some selected topics. Anyways, i found it helpful and complete for studying incentive theory but it requires deep understanding of optimization theory and some experience of economic-theorethic arguments. This book is written by a major contributor of the field. It would be hard to write another book to compete with this one in the field. . . Rating: - excellent bookA very clear book on the topic of information theory; pretty much everything you need as a graduate student. Covers all topics in substantial detail but with models that capture only the effects that are relevant. A great buy. |
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